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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of cross-listing in stock return dynamics with particular reference to 
feedback trading based on a sample of five most frequently traded cross-listed shares. We find that a 
long-run equilibrium relationship among the cross-listed share prices exists, but find no evidence of 
long-run co-movements among different shares traded in the same exchange. Furthermore, the VAR 
Granger causality tests indicate bi-directional feedback relations among the returns of cross-listed 
shares, while there is no consistent causality among different stocks within the markets. We also find 
that the cross-listed shares demonstrate strong volatility spillovers, which is driven by the covariance 
structure that are formed by variance and correlation terms. In addition, we report liquidity spillover 
effects and spillovers running from liquidity to volatility for some firms but no evidence that spillover 
effects run from volatility to liquidity.  
 
Keywords: Feedback trading, High-frequency trading, Cross-listing, Spillover, Volatility, Liquidity,  
 
JEL code: G12 G14 G17 
 
  
                                                          
*Corresponding author. Email: yizhe.dong@abdn.ac.uk   
2 
 
Highlights  
We examine the existence and significance of feedback trading on cross-listed shares.  
The cross-listed (cross-market) stocks share long run co-movements. 
The cross-listed stocks tend to have strong bi-directional causations among them. 
The informational spillovers on volatility and liquidity affect returns through feedback trading.   
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Does feedback trading drive returns of cross-listed shares? 
 
1. Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed hundreds of companies cross-listing their shares on exchanges in 
London, the United States, Hong Kong and Tokyo in order to gain access to more investors, greater 
liquidity and a lower cost of capital. Despite the growing popularity of cross-listing, scarce evidence 
exists in the literature on the impact of cross-listing on the trading behaviour of investors (see Eun and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Karolyi, 2006). In particular, to our knowledge, there is no empirical research on the 
presence of feedback trading for stocks traded in multiple markets. Therefore, this paper seeks to 
examine the role of cross-listing in stock return dynamics with particular reference to the presence and 
behaviour of feedback traders. Our central premise is that where the cross listing of shares occurs then 
there will be a greater presence of feedback traders. Moreover, with feedback traders operating in 
multiple markets, the degree of spillover effects between markets are expected to be enhanced as 
information transmission becomes more dynamic and active across markets. In existing spillover 
studies, the focus has mainly been on links between volatility in different markets (e.g., Tse, 1999; 
Miyakoshi, 2003; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2008). We argue that the presence of feedback trading, with 
informational spillovers affecting volatility, may also lead to a bi-directional causal relation between 
liquidity and volatility as the trading dynamics often affects the liquidity spillovers, hedging strategies 
and ultimately market dynamics (see, for example, Subrahmanyam, 1994; Grossman, 1998). Thus, we 
believe that the dynamics of cross-listed shares will differ from other share returns where feedback 
trading is less active, where there are less avenues for volatility spillovers and where we believe that a 
positive unidirectional relation will exist between liquidity and volatility. 
We consider a one dimension feedback-trading model based on the market equilibrium demand 
function and apply it to examine the existence and significance of feedback trading on some of the most 
frequently traded cross-listed shares in Europe. One such firm is Vodafone, which lists on LSE, BATS, 
Turquoise, ICE, ChiX, and Euronex. The choice of cross-listed shares forms a natural experiment in 
which to examine our proposed hypotheses. This is because cross-listed issuances share the same 
underlying asset and their price is driven by the same fundamentals, i.e., the underlying risk generating 
processes and exogenous shocks, such as market news. In theory, the prices of different shares in each 
segment would be the same if the pricing modelling can fully account for exchange rate and exogenous 
factors. The co-existence of market segmentation for the same fundamental share also correlates to the 
existence of feedback trading. Further, cross-listed shares tend to be frequently traded and their price 
movement would inevitably have an impact on the market.  
4 
 
Another important issue is the dominance of price discovery in a specific market segment, 
which potentially would indicate some location and/or speed advantages for traders who are interested 
in cross-market strategies and even arbitrage opportunities. From a trading perspective, geographic 
distribution leads to trade frictions, which potentially affect trading costs and therefore possibly 
influence the cross-market equilibrium (see Pagano, 1989; Glosten, 1994; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). 
Moreover, considering intra-day trading activities, the risk provision, which fundamentally generates 
price dynamics, should become more complex. Consequently, we conduct our experiment using high 
frequency data on both prices and transacted volumes to observe local equity dynamics and rollover 
effects day to day.  This means that we extend the existing literature on feedback trading based on 
volatility provision further to incorporate feedback from liquidity factors (e.g., Koutmos and Saidi, 2001; 
Antoniou, et al., 2005). Moreover, examining the causation structure between volatility and liquidity 
will provide a fuller understanding of the dynamics of the entire risk process. In particular, we add to 
the literature by focusing on cross-listed firms which provide a unique setting to examine how the 
informational spillovers on volatility and liquidity affect returns through feedback trading (e.g., 
Abhyankar et al., 1997; Angelidis and Andrikopoulos, 2010; Valenzuela et al. 2015).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical model. In Section 4, we develop the hypotheses and 
introduce the empirical methodology. Section 5 describes the data used and Section 6 presents and 
analyses the main empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature. 
In the literature, stock returns are widely found to display time-varying autocorrelation (see e.g., 
Atchison et al., 1987; Säfvenblad, 2000). Many studies argue that ‘noise’ traders, who make their 
investment decisions based on the previous price movement, partly contribute to autocorrelation in 
stock returns (e.g., De Long et al. 1990; Cutler et al. 1990). Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) provide 
evidence of positive feedback trading using index returns from the US equity market and find that, 
during low volatility periods, returns are positively autocorrelated but, during high volatility periods, 
feedback trading is more significant during market declines. Koutmos (1997) reports similar findings 
for six developed stock markets, while Koutmos and Saidi (2001) do so for six emerging markets. 
Further studies investigate the presence of feedback trading in other financial markets. This includes 
stock index futures (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2005; Salm and Schuppli, 2010; Hou and Li, 2014), foreign 
exchange markets (e.g., Vitale, 2000; Laopodis, 2005), exchange-traded fund markets (e.g., Chau et al., 
2011; Charteris et al, 2014), emissions and energy markets (Chau et al., 2015) and commodity markets 
(Heemeijer et al., 2009).  
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Further, research has suggested that cross listing can affect market competition and efficiency 
as well as asset liquidity. Hamilton (1979) argues that the dispersion of trading may increase 
competition and thus improve liquidity (competition effect); but it also may prevent full realization of 
any economies of centralized trading on the exchange (fragmentation effect). Mendelson (1987) argues 
that the consolidation of the order flow creates economies of scale, while Pagano (1989) shows that 
when shares are traded across two markets with similar structures and investor types, more traders are 
seen to be active in the market. Under information asymmetry, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) show that 
adverse selection costs increase with the number of markets listing an asset. Besides, when a new market 
opens for a stock, it may skim the least informed and consequently more profitable orders, and thus 
harm the liquidity of the primary market (Easley, et al, 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997). In 
practice, dealers or market makers are most able to cream-skim profitable orders, and market 
fragmentation between competing dealers usually results in larger spreads (for theoretical proofs see 
the models of Biais, 1993; Madhavan, 1995).  
Bennett and Wei (2006) provide empirical evidence that stock switching from the NASDAQ 
fragmented environment to the more consolidated NYSE structure experience an improvement in 
spreads. Using European data, Gajewski and Gresse (2007) show that trading costs are smaller in a 
centralized order book than in a hybrid market equally fragmented between an order book and 
competing dealers off the order book. Competition between market places often leads to improvements 
in liquidity (typically measured by spreads). Battalio (1997) and Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) show, 
across different markets, that liquidity improves (spreads fall) after entry to multiple markets. A range 
of other papers for both US and European markets has highlighted that multiple platforms lower trading 
costs and improve execution speed (e.g., Nguyen, et al., 2007; Mayhew, 2002; De Fontnouvelle et al., 
2003; Lee, 2002; Huang, 2002; Foucault and Menkveld, 2008, O’Hara and Ye, 2011). 
 
3. Theoretical Model. 
In order to develop a theoretical framework to take feedback trading into account, we begin with 
Shiller’s (1984) and Cutler et al. (1990) ‘fads’ model that considers smart and non-smart traders. The 
former usually operate trades actively and lead the trading and the latter tend to follow. At the market 
level, the demand function of shares that smart traders is given by: 
(1)                                                                  
 1
,
t t
s t
t
E r
D
 
                                                        
where ,s tD
 
is the fraction of shares demanded by smart traders at time t , which, together with the 
fraction of shares held by non-smart traders ( ,ns tD ), contributes to the overall demand for the shares 
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tD ; tr  is the ex-post return in period t .  1t tE r  is the expectation of the return in period t given the 
information up to and including time 1t  . The risk-free rate of return is given by  and t is the risk 
premium needed to induce them to hold all the shares. Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) assume that: 
(2)                                                                  
2
t t  
  
                                               
with ' 0  ,1 where 2t  is the variance of returns in period t
 
conditional on the filtration up to time 
1t  . Therefore, equation (1) can be re-written as:  
(3)                                                              1
, 2( )
t t
s t
t
E r
D
                                                
If all investors have homogeneous demand functions then, when the market reaches equilibrium, 
,s tD  takes the value 1 and we have 
(4)                                                  21( ) ( )t t tE r       (Merton, 1980)                   
Some form of feedback drives the demand from non-smart traders’, such as: 
(5)                                                                 , 1ns t tD r                                                                            
where 0  .2  In general, the overall demand function of a single stock will also take the value 1 when 
the market reaches equilibrium level  
(6)                                                              , , 1t s t ns tD D D                                                 
Equation (6) can be re-written as:  
                                                                
1
12
( ) 1( )
t t
t t
t
E rD r     
  
and multiplying by 2( )t 
 
we have: 
(7)                                                        
2 2
1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tE r r       
                                 
                                                          
1
 The condition 
 
¢
m > 0  implies that the smart traders are risk averse, so that a rise in expected volatility increases the risk 
premium needed to induce smart money to hold all the shares   
2
 If γ < 0, then negative feedback trading is implied (see Sentana and Wadhwani, 1992). 
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Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) suggest � is the feedback from volatility change into the return 
process. As the feedback effect usually occurs after the underlying risk process (.) , corresponding to 
trading and becoming an input to the return process, we propose that the feedback parameter to be 
stochastic and it should reflect some form of relation between liquidity and volatility. For example, 1t   
could be the causality between these two market components or could be the response function between 
them. Therefore, equation (7) is now written as: 
(8)                                           
2 2
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tE r r         
                   
We propose to add some novelty into a classic fad model in order to reflect equity return dynamics with 
consideration of feedback trading from both underlying volatility process and market liquidity provision. 
The theoretical model suggests that smart traders lead the price movement over the non-smart traders. 
Further, due to the segmentation of smart vs. non-smart traders and heterostochasticity, there exists 
feedback in the underlying transmission process (through volatility and autocorrelation terms).  
 
4. Empirical Design.  
4.1 The setting  
We aim to study how information transmission among shares impacts price formation of financial assets. 
The idea of identifying feedback trading is to consider the information spillover effects not only 
transmitted through the covariance structure of the series but also their correlation dynamics. From the 
perspective of information theory on price formation, it would be ideal if we can design natural 
experiments, which can test the information formation and decompositions (e.g., endogenous vs. 
exogenous information shocks) and their impact on price. In this paper, we select five top constituents 
of FTSE 100: Barclays (BARC), HSBC, BHP Biliton (BLT), Tesco and Vodafone (VOD), which are 
traded in three different venues: London Stock Exchange (LSE), BATS Europe (BS) and Turquoise 
(TQ).  We collect both the intra-day five-minute trade and quotes prices and volumes of these highly 
frequently traded shares. Except from LSE, BATS and Turquoise are the second and fourth largest 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) market places in Europe.  
To set up the experiment, we do not necessarily decompose the information (e.g. common vs. 
idiosyncratic) shocks by using some form of proxies. Instead, we utilize both the natural market 
segmentation and cross listing features of these shares to form systems to approximate information 
decomposition. For example, on the one hand, we take Barclays cross-listed in these three markets 
(BARCL, BARCBS and BARCTQ) to form a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR). Because these 
three issuances share the same fundamentals, their price movements should be affected by the same 
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exogenous shocks, such as local market news.  On the other hand, we examine all five stocks traded in 
the same market place (for example BARCL, HSBCL, BLTL, TESCOL and VODL), whose price 
increments should share the same common shocks but different trader specific shocks (idiosyncratic 
shocks specific to individual stocks). Therefore, in this case, it should be endogenous instead of the 
exogenous information flows.   
We, therefore, can thoroughly test information spillovers from four angles: long-run 
information structure (co-movement), short-run volatility spillover, short-run causality structure and 
short-run liquidity spillover. This experiment provides a simple and effective way of examining our 
research questions and the market and product structures without making brave assumptions regarding 
any proxies to capture informed or speculative trading effects.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses Formation 
The aim of this paper is to examine information transmission (or spillovers) among different issuances 
of the same underlying shares cross-listed in a few major stock markets in Europe. This reflects the 
underlying features of cross-listing in two folds: 1) for the same stock, although the listing of different 
issuances are located in different trading venues, price moves should still be driven by the same 
underlying risk/price generating process and common information shocks. The only factors to drive the 
price difference should be from the market segment specific information shocks and trading specific 
constraints of the venue where the issuances are listed; 2) in the same market, the price processes for 
different stocks clearly should be driven by their individual trading activities and shared market news 
within this market. Here, we acknowledge that there may be some traders who have an information or 
trading advantage (e.g. speed advantage) over others. However, as we have described previously, we 
adopt the philosophy of ‘fads’ model and categorize traders into ‘smart’ vs. ‘non-smart’ traders. We 
assume that that all information eventually will be reflected in the pricing process through the ‘fads’ 
information transmission mechanism either in the variance and/or serial correlation dynamics.  
Therefore, we postulate five main hypotheses concerning the information transmission and their impact 
on share prices.  
Cross-market shares are different issuances based on the same underlying assets of one specific 
firm traded in different markets while within-market shares are fundamentally different shares of 
different firms. Such differences stem from the nature that the cross-listed shares have same firm 
fundamentals and endogenous information shocks, which drive the underlying price generating process. 
What would affect their price changes should only be the exogenous shocks such as market news 
announcement in the local market and these effects usually tend to be absorbed by the market in a short 
while. Therefore, we expect to see long-run common trend for cross-listed shares in our sample 
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companies (e.g. VODL, VODBS and VODTQ) but not for these shares traded in one particular market 
(e.g. BARCL, BLTL, HSBCL, TSCOL and VODL). Given the above, our first hypothesis is formulated 
as follows:   
Hypothesis 1: Regarding the long-run structure, the cross-issuances tend to share at least one 
common trend while within-market shares would be unlikely to share co-movements in their price 
movements.  
Within market shares, the information causation structure for each of the shares in one particular 
market would be driven by their own independent random walks, therefore, the short-term price 
discovery through causality could be uni-directional, bi-directional or random. This means that we 
cannot conclude the price discovery dominance of any particular share over other shares through the 
information spillover through mean causality. In addition, the causality represents the short-run 
information dynamics in the mean structure of shares. For example, for Vodafone shares listed and 
traded in LSE, BS and TQ, they all have the same endogenous shock system. However, the exogenous 
shocks in these three markets will be different and these should be efficiently reflected in the short-term 
price movements. With trading features, we understand the LSE is a more dominant in terms of, for 
example, trading volume, thereby, we expect that the trading impact would lead to more dominant 
causality transmission from the LSE to the other two. We thus propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: For the cross-market shares, causality tends to be bi-directional for each pair 
of the three series.  
Hypothesis 2b: The causality spillover from LSE to BATS-Europe and/or Turquoise would be 
at higher level than the reverse direction. 
We suggest that in our system, the covariance structure should be decomposed into its variance 
and correlation. The classic GARCH model reveals the variance structure (2) or implied volatility and 
explains the risk-generating process of asset pricing. This is typically considered as volatility spillover 
effects. We argue that the correlation structure in our system also drives price updates and forms 
feedback trading, which specifically refers to the information shocks from the correlation structure into 
the underlying price evolution.  
For cross-listed shares, they have the same underlying assets and it is natural that, if the 
correlation terms are significant, the correlation shock transmission would, together with the variance 
terms, drive price movements. This means that, for instance, the volatility of VODL could lead to the 
change in the volatility of VODBS or vice versa. At the same time, the correlation term between them 
would also be significant and hence lead to the overall risk level (transformed variance) to change. 
However, within-market shares do not possess such features. For example, TSCO and HSBC are two 
completely different shares in nature, which do not share any natural underlying price processes. 
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Therefore, even if the correlation structure exists for their LSE listings, it is hard to conclude that 
TSCO’s correlation shock would also affect HSBC’s price movements. We endorse these views and 
express hypothesis 3 as: 
Hypothesis 3: The co-existence of market segmentation for the same fundamental share 
correlates to the existence of the volatility spillover and feedback trading. However, shares traded in 
the same market have volatility spillover but not strong feedback trading relations. 
Trading related information shocks should be reflected in the bid and ask profiles including 
both prices and volumes. Due to the cross-listing nature, when one issuance’s price moves due to trading, 
other issuances would also be affected with possible lead-lag effects. However, different firms traded 
in the same market could have entirely different trading profile, risk preferences, strategies and 
responses to even the same market or trading news. There is not necessary any fundamental that will 
drive their price together. Therefore, we do not expect to see liquidity spillovers among within-market 
shares and hypothesis can be expressed as follows:  
Hypothesis 4: The cross-market shares tend to have liquidity spillover while within-market 
shares’ liquidity spillover tends to be in random fashion.  
Finally, for the same firm cross listing their shares in three different markets, we expect to see 
stronger spillovers from liquidity to volatility although there might be bi-directional spillovers. When 
both volatility and liquidity drive prices, the different issuances would show different price movement 
only if their liquidity provisions are different as there is little differentiation in their volatility processes. 
On the contrary, if these five companies are all trading in LSE, they have their own individual volatility 
dynamics as well as liquidity provisions. It is harder to expect dominance from one provision to the 
other. For example, it is hard to conclude if or how VODL’s liquidity would affect TSCO’s volatility 
or vice versa. With consideration of intra-day trading behaviour, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The causality spillover between liquidity and volatility exists in cross-market 
shares not in within-market shares.  
 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical approach is categorised into three parts to test these five hypotheses. First, we estimate a 
vector error correction model (VECM) on multiple price series, both cross-issuances and cross-markets. 
We first use Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalues tests to examine the cointegration relation. 
Second, we examine the return and volatility spillovers with consideration of feedback. We construct 
the stationary component of the VECM over multiple price series for the same two purposes to estimate 
the VAR-MV-GARCH model to incorporate the ‘fads’ concept. Notably, such VAR elements with 
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feedback can be used to examine Granger-causality effects. We further calculate the time-varying 
beta/factor loading for a multi-factor CAPM with the feedback dynamics through the DCC, using the 
VECH specification of Bollerslev et al. (1988), Kraft and Engle (1982), Engle et al. (1984) and Engle 
(2002). For estimation methods, we adopt the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
For examining long-run approximation (Hypothesis 1), we use the classic cointegration (both 
Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalue) tests. For the short-run dynamics (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5), 
we focus on spillover effects with consideration of feedback in both return, variance and liquidity; hence, 
we construct the Granger causality tests (spillover in return and in liquidity) and VAR-MV-GARCH 
(spillover in covariance, which usually can be decomposed into variance and correlation). Tables 1(a) 
and (b) outline our general model specifications and summarize which of the approaches outlined is 
applied to our data set. 
                                                 Insert Table 1 here 
 
Cointegrating Relationship 
Defining a time series vector, yt , the standard VAR model is given as follows:  
(9)                                            
y
t
= P
i
Li y
t
i=1
p
å
+ c + u
t
                                                  
where Lis the backward shift operator, and therefore L
i y
t
= y
t - i .
 
P
i
 is the autoregression coefficients 
matrix,  c  is constant vector and  ut  a vector of residuals. When considering an error correction 
framework, the equivalent representation is given by: 
(10)                                          
D y
t
= F y
t - 1 + Y i L
i
i=1
p - 1 D yt + m + ut
      
Following Johansen (1988, 1991, 1994) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), we use a Full-Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) test to identify cointegrating vectors. It can test for cointegration by 
examining the rank of the matrix Φ.  
(11)                                         
F = P
i
i=1
p
å
- I
 
 and  
 
Y
i
= - P
j
j=i+1
p
å
                                                           
where the rank of 
F
 is zero then we have no long-run cointegrating relation, where the rank is full then 
the vector  yt  only contains stationary variables. The interesting case is where the rank is greater than 
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zero and less than full, which indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. That is, in a VAR where 
the number of series is given by n and k is the number of cointegrating vectors, where the rank of the 
matrix 
F
 is k  with 0 < k < n, then cointegration exists with n-k the number of stochastic trends. Let 
 
be the eigenvalues of the estimated matrix ˆF . The trace test of the null 
hypothesis that there are at most h  cointegrating relations, i.e. H0 : k £ h , against the alternative 
hypothesis H1 : k > h . The statistic is calculated as follows:  
(12)                                                  
 
L
trace
= - T log(1 - ˆl
i
)
i=h+1
n
å
  
   
The maximum eigenvalue test of the null hypothesis is that 
 
H0 : k = h , against the alternative 
hypothesis 
 
H1 : k = h +1 . The statistic is given as:3  
(13)                                                   
 
L
max
= - T log(1 - ˆl
h+1)
                                                                  
 
VAR-MV-GARCH and MLE Estimation 
Starting from the initial multivariate ARCH/GARCH proposed by Kraft and Engle (1982) and Engle et 
al. (1984), various variations and developments have been made4 and Bollerslev et al. (1988) model 
characterize the MV-GARCH (p,q) as follows: 
(14)                                                       D yt = P i L
i
D y
t
+ c + S
t
w + S
t
1
2
e
t
i=1
r
  
             
(15)                            vech S t( ) = k + L ivech S t - i12 e t - i S t - i12 e t - i( ) i=1p + G jvech S t - j( )j=1q               
                                                          
3
 Chen et al. (2011) proposed a bootstrap approach to enhance the robustness of these two tests. The method is to collect the 
eigenvalues
L
trace
, L
max
 and resample them with two residual series collected from the polynomial projection process 
described in formula (10). Then, they re-compute the canonical correlation series and their distributions following Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) and MacKinnon et al. (1999). Finally, they compare the two sets of critical statistics to decide whether the 
results of cointegration tests are robust or not. 
4
 See Gourieroux (1997), Engle (2002) and Cappiello et al. (2006).    
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e
t
 is an innovation white noise vector and the conditional covariance matrix is S t . The vector of 
residuals is S t
1
2
e
t
 
and w  is a constant vector of premium loadings.  The term vech .( )  denotes the 
column-stacking operator of the lower triangular portion of a symmetric matrix5. This, effectively, is 
the half-vectorization operator stacking only the different elements of a square matrix in a  1 1
2
n n  
vector of constants. This  1 1
2
n n  vector is the constant array of k . L , G  are symmetric coefficient 
matrices, both of which contain 
  21
2
n n    elements.6  S t  is a positive definite matrix and Engle and 
Kroner (1995) have provided proofs of this if all eigenvalues of  L i
i=1
p
å
+ G
j
j=1
q
å
 are smaller than one 
in modulus. 
For estimation, the class method is the likelihood function under the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE), which is written as: 
(16)        
 
1
1
1 1 1
1log 2 log
2 2
1
2
T
t
t
T r r
i i
t i t t t t i t t
t i i
nT
L L
  

  
   
                      

  y y c w y y c w                   
where the maximal values of the parameter vector are collected as: 
(17)                                     
 
q = P 1,…, P r ,c,w,k, L 1,…, L p , G 1,…, G qéë ùû                                           
For a given value of 
q
 the series 
 
S
t{ }t=1T  can be calculated recursively from equations (14) and (15) 
and the likelihood computed from equation (16). Then a search method can be used to obtain the 
maximal values of the parameter vector 
 
ˆ
q
 
and the associated estimated covariance matrices 
 
ˆ
S
t{ }t=1T . 
Regarding the specification of the multivariate probability distribution functions, the multivariate 
normal distribution can be used to obtain the density generator.  Alternatively, we could apply the Quasi 
                                                          
5
 The original calculation of MVGARCH(P) is found Kraft and Engle (1982) and Engle et al. (1984). 
6
 The dimensions of k, L , G are          1 1 1 1 11 1, 1 1 , 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
n n n n n n n n n n        . 
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Maximum Likelihood Procedure to the multivariate normal MLE. From the above procedure, the 
volatility transmission of shocks from the j th
 
variable to  ith  variable is the time-varying quantity 
derived from the estimated residual covariance matrix 
 
ˆ
S
t , which uses Bollerslev et al. (1988) to 
compute the time-varying beta t  loading of an I-CAPM model in equation: 
(18)                                                              
 
b
ij ,t
= ˆs
ij ,t
/ ˆs
jj,t
                                      
 
Liquidity approximation 
A link between liquidity and stock returns was established by, among others, Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). This work 
suggested that liquidity is a source of risk that should be priced in stock returns. Thus, a negative shock 
to liquidity would lead to fall in stock prices and current returns and an increase in expected future 
returns. Subsequent empirical evidence has supported this contention. This includes, for example, 
Amihud et al. (2013), Amihud et al. (2015) and Chiang and Zheng (2015). 
As liquidity is an unobservable variable, several proxies have been suggested, including the 
bid-ask spread, trading costs and trading volume and turnover, here, in order to capture the effects of 
liquidity we implement the method of Amihud (2002), which has become a popular method (see, for 
example, the discussion in Chiang and Zheng, 2015). The approach of Amihud provides a measure of 
illiquidity and is given by: 
(19)                                          Ai,t = │Ri,t│ / VOLDi,t                                                                                                    
where │Ri,t│ represents the absolute return on stock i at time t and VOLDi,t represents the corresponding 
cash volume. This measure implies that a higher level of volume is associated with higher liquidity 
(lower illiquidity) and represents the absolute return (price change) per monetary unit of trading volume. 
Thus, it is intended to capture price impact. In our analysis, we compute this ratio for each stock return 
series and examine the interactions across and within the different markets both with volatility and the 
illiquidity of other return series. To do this, we use a VAR framework and examine the Granger 
causality results.  
  
5. Data and Sample. 
In this paper, we select five top constituents of FTSE 100: Barclays, BHP Billiton, HSBC, Tesco and 
Vodafone, which are traded in three different venues: London Stock Exchange (LSE), BATS Europe 
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and Turquoise.  We collect both the intra-day five-minute trade and quotes prices and volumes of these 
highly frequently traded shares. BATS-Europe and Turquoise are the second and fourth largest MTFs 
(Multilateral Trading Facilities) market places in Europe.  
The data sample runs from October 17, 2011 to October 15, 2013. The trading hours for three 
markets are synchronized to the standard GMT time: 8:00 am to 16:30pm GMT from Mondays to 
Fridays excluding public holidays.7 Data outside the trading hours are also eliminated from our sample.  
In the end, for each company share in each market, we obtain between 50,000 and 51,300 data points 
over 504 trading days. The number of observations range from 50,435 to 51,027 in different markets as 
we have to match all cross-market shares in order to operate on the balanced VAR models (see Table 
2).  
As we use the intra-day data, various forms of prices for both trades and quotes are available 
from Thomson ReutersTM TickHistory including open, close, high and low: we use close prices in this 
paper. In the literature, some researchers suggest to use the average of the high and low of each interval 
as the 5-minute trade, bid and ask prices. Others take the halves of the previous interval’s close price 
and the current interval’s open price. We tried both methods in our initial cleaning process. However, 
not only do we have normal missing data problem, we also end up with quite a number of odd cases: 
one of the fields has missing data (for example, March 17, 2012, 12:45pm, the trade low is missing), 
the price for that particular interval will suddenly drop by half in comparison to the price at 12:40pm. 
Therefore, we decided to take the simple approach and use the close price at the end of each five minutes 
during the trading hours. The advantage of this is not only in its simplicity but also to avoid unnecessary 
nuisance data records further generated in the process of basic calculations (e.g. to avoid ‘dlog0’ case 
when calculating returns). When we use the closing price of each interval, it also shows less missing 
observations; especially we have not spotted any chunks of missing data. Therefore, it seems that our 
choice helps keep our sample ‘cleaner’. We use the normal backfilling method to fill the missing data 
and make all series having continuous records.  
From the original trade price series, we calculate log-prices and return series for all, and the 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. Across all shares in three locations, they are all positively 
or negatively skewed to certain levels and the kurtoses show that these liquid shares are carrying heavy 
tails. However, these are typical features we would expect from financial time series, especially at 
higher frequency. We choose five-minute frequency by following the usual practice in the literature and 
it has been documented that 2- or 5- minute intervals would eliminate microstructure noise effects better 
                                                          
7
 Christmas Eve only trades half-day. 
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than using 1-minute data (see Bacry et al., 2011). We have also plotted the time-varying volume for 
each share and presented them in Figure 1.  
Insert Table 2 Here 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
We run unit root tests on log-price and return series to check the non-stationarity and 
stationarity respectively. We have found all price series to be I (1) and returns I (0).  We further utilize 
the information criteria (Akaike and Schwarz) to work out the optimal lag to be 2. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Cointegration relationship cross-market vs. within-market 
We hypothesise that for the same stock cross-listed in three different trading venues there will be 
cointegrating relations among each three issuances. From our empirical results, we have clear evidence 
to support the hypothesis 1. In Table 3 Panel (a), both the Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalue tests 
suggest that all five selected company shares demonstrate two cointegrating vectors.8 To be more 
specific, Johansen trace test show that Barclays, HSBC and Vodafone have got one cointegration trend 
each while BHP Billiton and Tesco share two common trends among their three issuances. It is also 
known that these two types of cointegration tests’ null hypotheses are complimentary to each other. 
Therefore, to obtain the consistent results from both tests, we can conclude that cross-listed (cross-
market) shares share long run co-movements. This means that although individual price series of the 
same share follow random walks, they share at least one common trend and the price movements among 
the three series converge in the long run.  
We also hypothesize that, when looking at one specific market (e.g. LSE), the five different 
company shares have their own independent price generating processes. In Table 3 Panel (b), we see 
no integrating vectors for these five shares traded in LSE, nor BATS-Europe or Turquoise.  This is 
evidence to support our within-market hypothesis for the long run price movement structure. This is 
presumably because these highly liquid shares have no common characteristics but are exposed to the 
same common shocks (exogenous); therefore, the idiosyncratic risk (or trader specific risk) would be 
                                                          
8
 In Panel (a), by examining the actual figures of the test statistics, we found BHP and Tesco are significant at the step of 
2r  , which indicates three cointegrating vectors. However, this is contradictory to the theory and we can see that the 
acceptance of significance is weak and marginal. Therefore, we should be confident in only claiming two cointegrating vectors 
for these firms. 
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the primary generating power leading the price changes. Clearly, all of them have different and possibly 
unique firm fundamentals, and hence, different trader specific risk dominating the price evolvements. 
Even for Barclays and HSBC in the same sector, we would think they might have completely 
independent price update processes as their individual specific trading impact (highly frequently traded 
stock) may overwhelm the impact from the shared industrial features. 
The findings of the long-run information and price structure can be practically useful. For 
example, for cross market investments, investors can use the dominant issuance’s price movement as 
indicators to better understand how other two issuances could behave; therefore, to form more effective 
and efficient cross-market hedging for risk and trading purpose.  Within a market, each company share 
appears to behave independently from one another in the long-run.  In this scenario, it may be better for 
investors to choose funds instead of individual stocks to better hedge risks. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
6.2 Granger Causality Test cross-market vs. within-market 
After examining the long run dynamics for both cross-market and within-market shares, we start to 
study the short run structures of these series in three different ways. In our second hypothesis, we 
suggest that the cross-market shares tend to have bi-directional causation between each pair of the three 
issuances and so is the block causality (‘ALL’ in the results). There may not be one specific dominant 
information transmission series. However, we expect the LSE would be the market with higher level of 
causation transmission impact on the other two markets but not vice versa. If observing the shares traded 
within the same market, the Granger causation structure in mean may differ from the cross-market case. 
It could be uni-directional, bi-directional or random for each pair of the five company shares. This 
means that we cannot conclude the price discovery dominance of any particular share over other shares 
through the information spillover through mean causality.  
Our estimation of different information causation structures for these shares in different 
multivariate settings is based on the underlying information theory of exogenous and endogenous 
shocks driving updates in the mean differently in a non-homogenous market. In Table 4, Panel (a) shows 
that strong causation (99% significance level marked as ***) for cross-market shares exists everywhere 
in share pairs and one series and its corresponding blocks. The information shocks in the mean process 
spillover to each other bi-directionally for all these companies. For the block causation, it is evident that 
LSE always has higher level of causality in comparison to BATS and Turquoise. For example, the ‘ALL’ 
causality statistics of BARCL, BARCBS and BARCTQ are 1249.83, 672.11 and 250.78 respectively, 
18 
 
showing that BARCL possesses more dominance regarding causality transmission over the rest of the 
system.   
When we study the pairs of shares, we can find bi-directional causation flows for all 
combinations but one flow tends to be more prominent than the other. More specifically, the stronger 
information causality are from TQ to LSE, TQ to BATS and LSE to BATS, (for example, BARCL to 
BARCBS is 168.32 while BARCBS to BARCL is 33.42; thus, LSE spills causality to BATS). The 
explanation for LSE overpowers BATS causation could be that LSE has been the largest trading venue 
in Europe by size. In a different case, TQ, is smaller in size than BATS but it has higher causality impact 
on LSE. It is worth to note that as the second largest trading venue in Europe, the causality transmission 
of BATS-Europe outflows to the other two markets appear to be weaker than its inflows from them. 
This means it has lower level of dominance in affecting other two markets’ information structure 
changes. We argue this could be because this market tends to be considered riskier than LSE and BATS 
by traders.  
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
For within-market shares (see Table 4, Panel (b)), we still can observe the block causations for 
most markets apart from BHP Billiton traded on BATS and Turquoise (the ‘ALL’s are 6.87 (0.55) and 
6.83 (0.55)). Moreover, we notice that the TSCOTQ’s block causality is significant at 95% instead of 
99%.  For the five shares traded in the same market (LSE, BATS or Turquoise), we identify cases of 
bi-directional, uni-directional and no causality spillover and some examples (e.g. LSE) include: 
 Bi-directional cases: 1) BARCL and HSBCL share strong bi-directional causality spillovers (both 
directions are ***); and 2) BLTL transmits information flows to HSBCL significantly at 99% 
while HSBCL does it to BLTL at 90%.  Uni-directional case: TSCOL has causality spillover to HSBCL at 95% but HSBCL does not spill 
information shocks to TSCOL.   No spillover case: TSCOL and BARCL do not have any causality spillover between them.  
  Similar observations can be found for BATS and Turquoise. Therefore, we can sufficiently 
provide evidence to support our second hypothesis. . For investors, these are particularly important. For 
example, if they hold shares which have the bi-directional information flows, the price changing in one 
could also affect the other. This means, the share price of one would respond to the price change in the 
other.  Oppositely, if I own TSCOL and BARCL, I would not need to worry much about how their price 
movements could affect each other.   
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6.3 Volatility spillover cross-market vs. within-market  
After examining the mean structures, we move on to look at variance structure through volatility 
spillovers with consideration of FAD’s type of feedback. The third hypothesis 3 predicts that the cross-
market shares would demonstrate strong volatility spillovers driven by both the covariance and 
correlation structures due to the co-existence of market segmentation for the same fundamental share. 
But such factor loading transmission for within-market companies would feature different dynamics.  
Figure 2 Panels (a) to (e) show the time-varying factor loadings of five groups of cross-market 
shares. As expected, the multivariate factor loadings are all noisy, which indicates that the responses to 
information shocks through the covariance structures of these cross-listed shares are bi-directional but 
may be at different levels. In general, the BxxxL, xxxBS and BxxxL, xxxTQ tend to be noisier in comparison to 
other risk factors and usually, the fluctuations of BxxxBS, xxxTQ appears to be within a relatively smaller 
range. Vodafone’s VAR-MV-GARCH seems slightly different from other four companies, in which the 
information shocks stemming from BATS and Turquoise are within narrower bounds (Panel (e), plots 
in the second and third rows apart from the diagonal ones).  We think this makes sense if we consider 
the size of Vodafone traded in LSE comparing to that in BATS and Turquoise. Certainly, the size 
features may be common for other selected shares but we argue possibly this IT share may respond to 
a size factor more sensitively. It also could be due to the features of Vodafone itself. Again, the clear 
picture of volatility transmission directly shows investors how the underlying risk of one share (or 
issuance) performs relative to the other share (or issuance). The dominance and direction of volatility 
would benefit the risk manager to better manage their risk exposure and more efficiently decide their 
hedging strategies (e.g. long or short) to allocate their capitals and balance the book.  
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
 
In Table 5 Panel (a), we report the transformed variance coefficientsl. The coefficients of error 
terms and covariance matrices are stored in A and B . The covariance matrices, in theory, are formed 
of variance and correlation terms and proxies the information feedback trading idea described in the 
FAD’s model. For cross-market cases, we find that both transmission vectors are significant for all five 
different companies. This is consistent with our hypothesis and the theory: the nature of cross-listed 
shares means that they share same endogenous shocks and the geographical closeness of the actual 
trading provide similar exogenous information. Therefore, we should not be surprised to observe that 
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the volatility spillovers are driven by the covariance correlation matrices) jointly while the literature 
often suggests that covariance is the single factor evolving the price updates.  
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
In contrast, when we examine the within-market variance transmissions in Figure 3, Panels (a) 
to (c) and Table 5, Panel (b). The time-varying factor loadings indicating the initiation from Barclays 
to other companies tend to be the noisiest (e.g. the five plots in the first row of Panel (a)) and the ones 
starting from Tesco and Vodafone the least in both LSE and BATS. However, the Turquoise scenario 
looks quite different from the other two and it is not obvious that the factor loadings initiated from one 
company appear to be substantially smaller than others’. The Table 5, Panel (b) indicates that the factor 
loading updates are driven by the covariance terms. Apart from the diagonal elements in A, all other 
elements are not significant, which means that the correlation transmission would not be positive 
indefinite. This suggests no feedback transmission among these within-market shares.  
 
6.4 Liquidity spillover cross-market vs. within-market  
In Table 6, Panel (a), we report the Granger causality tests for liquidity and between liquidity and 
volatility. These results follow similar logic to the volatility spillover in that we need study cross-
spillover outcomes.9  
However, the results here are a bit more complicated as we are studying more than one market 
provision. There should be three different scenarios: 1) cross-liquidity spillover; 2) liquidity to volatility 
spillover (L-to-V); and 3) volatility to liquidity spillover (V-to-L). These are essential as with more than 
one provision involved to affect the market structure, not only the individual factor may drive the pricing 
process but also the interaction or the dynamics between the two provisions would impact the 
underlying process. One important reason why we form the idea of examining the feedback effects is 
exactly because the correlated behavior of two risk factors may drive the price movement in a more 
systematic way.  
                                                          
9
 Following the rational of our analysis of volatility in 6.3, self-spillover refers to transmission from an observable to itself 
(e.g. liquidity to volatility from BARCL to BARCL; volatility to liquidity from BARCL to BARCL). while cross-spillover 
means the transmission from one observable to another (e.g. liquidity spillover from BARCL to BLTBS; liquidity to volatility 
spillover from BARCL to BARCTQ; volatility to liquidity spillover from BARCL to BLTBS). 
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To look at the causality structure beyond volatility or liquidity individually also has practical 
implications. Similar to volatility studies, the liquidity spillovers explain how price movements related 
to trading behavior affect one another.  For example, if two shares such as VODTQ and VODBS have 
no liquidity spillover (i.e. A0) and this can be interpreted that the price changes of VODTQ and VODBS 
are independent from how each other is traded in the market. In a different case, BARCBS responds to 
liquidity shocks in BARCL (one-way), which means that when Barclay shares traded in London have 
price fluctuation (usually associated with trading/quoting prices and volumes at the specific time), its 
cross-listed shares in BATS would respond to the London price changes. Of course, the bi-directional 
spillovers reveal the dynamic relations between any two price movements.  
When it comes to volatility and liquidity, it is important to know the dynamic between them. If 
there were transmission from volatility to liquidity, this may indicate that volatility is the primary driver 
for price updates and it is associated with the underlying risk process; if vice versa, it could be 
understood that it is mainly the trading activities affecting the price movements. This could be useful 
in identifying some phenomena occurred in the market such as the sharp changes at the end of the 
trading day (the extreme case is called ‘black swan’). When such phenomena happen, usually we can 
observe sharp price changes and volatility shoot up dramatically, however, these are usually caused by 
the traders deliberately pushing volatility up through buy or sell in blocks in order to figure out the true 
market supply and demand. This may be their utmost task as they need to balance their own books (to 
zero position at the end of the trading day) without exposing their positions in the market.  We now 
shall discuss these causation structures one by one: 
 First, we find that for cross-liquidity spillovers, majority are not significant. However, we find 
both bi-directional and uni-directional spillover in liquidity among some of the shares. The details are 
as follows: 
1) Uni-directional liquidity spillover: BARCL to BARCBS; BLTBS to BLTL; TSCOL to 
TSCOBS; VODTQ to VODL; and VODBS to VODL 
2) Bi-directional liquidity spillover: BARCL to/from BARCTQ; BARCBS to/from BARCTQ; 
HSBCL to/from HSBCTQ and BLTL to/from BLTTQ.  
It is, in fact, quite clear that these significant cross-spillovers are mostly from LSE to other 
markets, especially the bi-directional pairs. 
 
Insert Table 6 Here 
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The second category (B) except for BLTBS, whilst Tesco and Vodafone only show self-L-to-
V spillovers in the LSE market. Barclays, HSBC and BHP Billiton all show significant self- L-to-V 
spillovers (B1); whilst Tesco and Vodafone have the opposite results.  Looking at all cross L-to-V 
spillovers, we find that the two banking shares, Barclays and HSBC, traded across three markets (LSE, 
BS and Turquoise) have liquidity spilled over to volatility in all combination of pairs. This means, for 
example, a pair of cross-traded HSBC shares, they have bi-directional L-to-V spillovers: HSBCL 
to/from HSBCBS.  
BLT has liquidity causality transmitted into the volatility structures of all pairs apart that there 
is no causation in BLTL’s volatility led by BLTBS’ liquidity movements (Notice that L-to-V causation 
from BLTL to BLTBS is significant and this forms a uni-directional L-to-V spillover for this 
combination). In contrast, most cross-market share pairs of Tesco and Vodafone bear no cross-
spillovers from liquidity to volatility. There are two different cases: TSCOL’s liquidity changes lead to 
causality in TSCOBS’ volatility and the same between VODL and VODBS, also VODL and VODTQ.   
The last causality structure (C) is the spillover effects from volatility to liquidity (V-to-L).  
Opposite to the L-to-V spillovers, we find no cross-spillovers for all. This means that, cross shares, 
volatility does not intrigue causality in liquidity. For self-spillovers, we only notice one significant V-
to-L spillover for each share: BARCBS to BARCBS, HSBCL to HSBCL, BLTL to BLTL, TSCOL to 
TSCOL and VODL to VODL. Again, we find LSE is the main destination of detecting self-spillover 
effects if significant. 
To briefly sum up, for cross-market shares, if the causality spillovers of liquidity or between 
liquidity and volatility are significant, they usually more likely exist in cross-spillover effects. We also 
conclude that it is more possible for liquidity to drive the volatility to change but not vice versa. Finally, 
we find both uni-directional and bi-directional causality of liquidity or between liquidity and volatility.   
In Panel (b), we run these three tests (liquidity (A), liquidity to volatility (B) and volatility to 
liquidity (C) spillover) for within-market shares, which are five companies traded at the same time 
within the same market (e.g. LSE). We continue to use the terms of self-spillover and cross-spillover to 
interpret our results.  
For cross-spillover in liquidity, we see all in LSE, two in BATS (BARCBS to BLTBS and 
BLTBS to HSBCBS) and four in Turquoise (BARCTQ to BLTTQ; HSBCTQ to BARCTQ; and a bi-
directional spillover between HSBCTQ and BLTTQ). Such rareness is similar to the cross-market 
situation.   
For the L-to-V causality structure, Tesco shares traded in LSE, BATS-Europe and Turquoise 
present no liquidity transmitting into volatility in their own underlying processes. In BATS and 
Turquoise, Vodafone also shows no L-to-V causality.   
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In LSE, most shares spill liquidity to other shares’ volatility. There are only four insignificant 
ones including BARCL to TSCOL; BARCL to VODL; HSBCL to TSCOL and HSBCL to VODL. This, 
in turn, makes the L-to-V spillovers of these two banking shares to Tesco and Vodafone shares to 
operate in one direction only. In BATS, less significant cross-spillover from liquidity to volatility are 
found and there are altogether eight null L-to-V causality transmissions including five uni-directional 
(BARCBS to TSCOBS, HSBCBS to TSCOBS, BLTBS to BARCBS, BLTBS to TSCOBS and VODBS 
to HSBCBS) and three bi-directional ones (BARCBS to VODBS, BLTBS to VODBS and TSCOBS to 
VODBS). For HSBCBS (or BLTBS) in particular, its volatility updates are driven substantially by some 
source of liquidity from itself and other shares (such as BARC, BLT and TSCO) traded in the same 
market. In Turquoise, there are even less significant spillovers in this kind apart from BARCTQ to 
HSBSTQ, BARCTQA to BLTTQ, BLTTQ to HSBCTQ and BLTTQ to BARCTQ. 
Finally, for the volatility-to-liquidity spillover, there have been no cross-spillover across all five 
shares traded in three markets respectively. For the self-spillover, the only evidence is seen in BARCL 
to BARCL.   
 
7. Conclusion 
We consider a feedback-trading model that assumes two different groups of investors, i.e. risk averse 
expected utility maximizing investors and feedback traders, and apply it to examine the existence and 
significance of feedback trading through the underlying risk generating process of five most frequently 
traded cross-listed stocks.  When the stocks are cross-listed in multiple markets, theoretically, they share 
the same fundamentals and therefore any price difference should be from market specific information 
shocks and the trading specific constraints of the exchanges. Therefore, the cross-listed shares form an 
empirical test with some novelty to investigate the presence and behaviour of feedback traders. This 
paper contributes to the literature by showing how the information spillovers on volatility and liquidity 
affect returns through feedback trading. Our major findings are summarized as follows.  
Based on Johansen cointegration tests, we find that cross-listed (cross-market) stocks share long 
run co-movements, suggesting that although individual price series are characterised as random walk 
processes, they share at least one common trend and the price movements among the (three) prices 
series converge in the long run.  Our Granger causality test results suggest that the cross-listed shares 
tend to have strong bi-directional causations among them and the LSE always has higher level of 
causality in comparison with BATS and Turquoise. However, we did not find the price discovery 
dominance of any particular share over other shares through the information spillover. Our findings 
also show that for cross-market shares, if the causality spillovers of liquidity or between liquidity and 
volatility are significant, they are usually more likely to exist in cross-spillover effects. We also 
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conclude that it is more likely that liquidity drives volatility change but not vice versa. Finally, we find 
both uni-directional and bi-directional causality of liquidity or between liquidity and volatility.   
 To sum up, we examine the information structure of the underlying price formation process 
from multiple angles. The key belief is that with fluctuation in the underlying process, returns of 
securities will change subsequently and we argue that information formation is the primary driver, 
especially the short-run provisions such as volatility and liquidity. It is important is trying to understand 
the causes of movement in returns, to understand the information structures and the factors that cause 
them to change. Our main finding and contribution to the literature is that the underlying risk process 
does not only rely on the variance (or volatility) process but also the correlation processes. We conclude 
that there exists a dynamic between volatility and liquidity, which ultimately affects returns.  Finally, 
we find that the form and nature of such interactions vary across the nature of each share’s features such 
as cross listing.  In terms of future work, we propose that we can further look into the covariance 
matrices and study the structure of the variance and correlation terms in order to understand the 
feedback structure and the volatility spillovers. The theoretical work to assist this already lies in the 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation method proposed by Engle (2002) and other related work such as 
Kim (2002), Tse and Tgui (2002) and Engle and Sheppard (2006). 
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Tables  
Table 1: Generic model specifications . 
Model Name Endogenous 
(a) VECM Models Cross-markets 
Barclays �� =[logBARCL, logBARCBS, logBARCTQ] 
HSBC �� =[logHSBCL, logHSBCBS, logHSBCTQ] 
BHP Billiton �� =[logBLTL, logBLTBS, logBLTTQ] 
Tesco �� =[logTSCOL, logTSCOBS, logTSCOTQ] 
Vodfone ��=[logVODL, logVODBS, logVODTQ] 
 Within-market 
LSE ��=[logBARCL, logHSBCL, logBLTL,  logTSCOL, logVODL] 
BATS-Europe ��=[logBARCBS, logBLTBS, logHSBCBS, logTSCOBS, logVODBS] 
Turquoise ��=[logBARCBS, logBLTBS, logHSBCBS, logTSCOBS, logVODBS] 
(b)VAR-MV-GARCH Models Cross markets 
Barclays ��=[ΔlogBARCL,Δ logBARCBS, ΔlogBARCTQ] 
HSBC ��=[ΔlogHSBCL,ΔlogHSBCBS, ΔlogHSBCTQ] 
BHP Billiton ��=[ΔlogBLTL, ΔlogBLTBS, ΔlogBLTTQ] 
Tesco ��=[ΔlogTSCOL, ΔlogTSCOBS, ΔlogTSCOTQ] 
Vodfone ��=[ΔlogVODL, ΔlogVODBS, ΔlogVODTQ] 
 Within-market 
LSE ��=[ΔlogBARCL, ΔlogBLTL, ΔlogHSBCL, ΔlogTSCOL, ΔlogVODL] 
BATS-Europe ��=[ΔlogBARCS, ΔlogBLTBS, ΔlogHSBCBS, ΔlogTSCOBS, ΔlogVODBS] 
Turquoise ��=[ΔlogBARCTQ, ΔlogBLTTQ, ΔlogHSBCTQ, ΔlogTSCOTQ, ΔlogVODTQ] 
Notes: The panel (a) of table defines the VECM model identifiers for the long run cointegration analysis described in Section 
3.4. The panel (b) of table defines the model identifiers for the VAR-MV-GARCH model described in Section 3.4. logBARC_L 
is the logarithm of Barclays share price in LSE; ΔlogBARC_L is the logarithmic return of Barclay share traded in the LSE; 
The other abbreviations in the table are to be similarly interpreted.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.  
  Barclays HSBC BHP Billiton Tesco Vodafone 
LSE Mean 3.74E-06 2.24E-06 -6.05E-07 -9.89E-07 2.08E-06 
 Std. dev. 1.23E-03 6.12E-04 8.54E-04 6.18E-04 6.77E-04 
 Skewness -0.186 -0.327 -0.113 -5.929 1.476 
 Kurtosis 60.178 39.674 56.467 527.558 328.488 
 Jarque-Bera 6944710 2860547 6062563 5.79E+08 2.24E+08 
BATS-Europe Mean 3.74E-06 2.25E-06 -6.02E-07 -9.91E-07 2.08E-06 
 Std. dev. 1.168E-03 6.48E-04 8.13E-04 5.68E-04 5.83E-04 
 Skewness -0.2037 -0.363 -0.259 -8.349 2.477 
 Kurtosis 63.798 47.103 56.821 690.314 425.920 
 Jarque-Bera 7851863 4136411 6143577 9.93E+08 3.79E+08 
Turquoise Mean 3.73E-06 2.25E-06 -6.20E-07 -9.79E-07 2.07E-06 
 Std. dev. 1.17E-03 6.11E-04 8.13E-04 5.64E-04 5.81E-04 
 Skewness -0.104 -0.392 -0.159 -8.664 2.397 
 Kurtosis 66.709 38.735 56.748 712.515 424.262 
 Jarque-Bera 8621321 2716337 6126561 1.06E+09 3.76E-08 
 No. of Obs. 50979 51027 50898 50435 50834 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of returns of five chosen stocks traded in three different venues. These returns 
are at 5-min frequency and over a period between 17/10/2011 and 15/10/2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 3: Cointegration tests.  
Panel (a): Cross-markets shares Cointegration Test 
Company H0: r≤ Trace test Max. eigenvalue test 
  Critical value (5%) Test statistic Critical value (5%) Test statistic 
Barclays 0 29.80 28546.29* 21.13 14606.68* 
 
1 15.49 13939.61* 14.26 13937.21* 
 
2 3.84 2.39 3.84 2.39 
HSBC 0 29.80 28997.10* 21.13 14574.81* 
 1 15.49 14422.29* 14.26 14420.75* 
 2 3.84 1.54 3.84 1.54 
BHP Billiton 0 29.80 28645.02* 21.13 14442.62* 
 1 15.49 14202.40* 14.26 14192.63* 
 2 3.84 9.76* 3.84 9.76* 
Tesco 0 29.80 28077.02* 21.13 14181.82* 
 1 15.49 13895.20* 14.26 13890.22* 
 2 3.84 4.98* 3.84 4.98* 
Vodafone 0 29.80 28199.75* 32.13 14349.35* 
 1 15.49 13850.40* 14.26 13849.64* 
 2 3.84 0.762 3.84 0.762 
Panel (b): Within-Market shares Cointegration Test 
Company H0: r≤ Trace test Max. eigenvalue test 
  Critical value (5%) Test statistic Critical value (5%) Test statistic 
LSE 0 69.82 64.086 33.88 23.45 
 1 47.85 40.63 27.58 21.32 
 2 29.80 19.31 32.13 11.88 
 3 15.49 7.42 14.26 5.519 
 4 3.84 1.91 3.84 1.91 
Bats-Europe 0 69.82 59.99 33.88 22.96 
 1 47.85 37.03 27.58 21.09 
 2 29.80 15.93 32.13 8.83 
 3 15.49 7.10 14.26 4.52 
 4 3.84 2.57 3.84 2.57 
Turquoise 0 69.82 63.43 33.88 22.89 
 1 47.85 40.53 27.58 21.27 
 2 29.80 19.25 32.13 11.88 
 3 15.49 7.36 14.26 5.46 
 4 3.84 1.91 3.84 1.90 
Notes: We test the long-run cointegrating relationship 1) for the same share cross-listed in three different trading venues; and 
2) five different shares within the same market. We report both Johansen Trace and Maximum eigenvalue test results in order 
to obtain robust results. r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors; * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% significant 
level. 
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests.  
Panel (a): Cross-markets Granger Causality Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
BARCL BARCBS 33.42*** 
(0.00) 
BARCBS BARCL 168.32*** 
(0.00) 
BARCTQ BARCOL 165.04*** 
(0.00) 
 BARCTQ 252.05*** 
(0.00) 
 BARCTQ 297.03*** 
(0.00) 
 BARCTBS 33.51*** 
(0.00) 
 All 1249.83*** 
(0.00) 
 All 672.11*** 
(0.00) 
 All 250.78*** 
(0.00) 
HSBCL HSBCBS_
R 
96.77*** 
(0.00) 
HSBCBS HSBCL 113.99*** 
(0.00) 
HSBCTQ HSBCL 109.14*** 
(0.00) 
 HSBCTQ_
R 
188.63*** 
(0.00) 
 HSBCTQ_
R 
196.99*** 
(0.00) 
 HSBCBS 126.32*** 
(0.00) 
 All 1369.79*** 
(0.00) 
 All 468.07*** 
(0.00) 
 All 314.34*** 
(0.00) 
BLTL BLTBS 52.36*** 
(0.00) 
BLTBS BLTL 135.22*** 
(0.00) 
BLTTQ BLTL 125.25*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTTQ 223.80*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTTQ 257.60*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTBS 52.43*** 
(0.00) 
 All 1220.81*** 
(0.00) 
 All 615.80*** 
(0.00) 
 All 223.39*** 
(0.00) 
TSCOL TSCOBS 82.99*** 
(0.00) 
TSCOBS TSCOL 107.41*** 
(0.00) 
TSCOTQ BLTL 100.95*** 
(0.00) 
 TSCOTQ 347.56*** 
(0.00) 
 TSCOTQ 471.46*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTBS 104.72*** 
(0.00) 
 All 1977.52*** 
(0.00) 
 All 885.22*** 
(0.00) 
 All 251.04*** 
(0.00) 
VODL_R VODBS 83.99*** 
(0.00) 
VODBS_R VODL 107.41*** 
(0.00) 
VODTQ VODL 100.95*** 
(0.00) 
 VODTQ 347.56*** 
(0.00) 
 VODTQ 471.46*** 
(0.00) 
 VODBS 104.72*** 
(0.00) 
 ALL 1977.52*** 
(0.00) 
 ALL 885.22*** 
(0.00) 
 ALL 251.04*** 
(0.00) 
Panel (b): Within-Market shares Granger Causality Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded Chi-sq 
(Prob.) 
LSE BATS-Europe                            Turquoise 
BARCL HSBCL 17.09*** 
(0.00) 
BARCBS HSBCBS 3.86 
(0.15) 
BARCTQ HSBCTQ 3.86 
(0.15) 
 BLTL 64.19*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTBS 30.73*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTTQ 30.92*** 
(0.00) 
 TSCOL 3.80 
(0.15) 
 TSCOBS 5.98** 
(0.05) 
 TSCOTQ 4.50 
(0.11) 
 VODL 1.37 
(0.50) 
 VODBS 1.06 
(0.59) 
 VODTQ 0.08 
(0.96) 
 All 114.74*** 
(0.00) 
 All 40.45*** 
(0.00) 
 All 33.65*** 
(0.00) 
HSBCL BARCL 39.81*** 
(0.00) 
HSBCBS BARCBS 2.27 
(0.32) 
HSBCTQ BARC 10.49*** 
(0.01) 
 BLTL 36.95*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTBS 7.37** 
(0.03) 
 BLTTQ 5.57* 
(0.06) 
 TSCOL 10.94** 
(0.04) 
 TSCOBS 5.22* 
(0.07) 
 TSCOTQ 1.45 
(0.48) 
 VODL 18.80*** 
(0.00) 
 VODBS 2.25 
(0.32) 
 VODTQ 3.78 
(0.15) 
 All 167.93*** 
(0.00) 
 All 26.19*** 
(0.00) 
 ALL 33.11*** 
(0.00) 
BLTL BARCL 37.84*** 
(0.00) 
BLTBS BARCBS 4.72* 
(0.09) 
BLTTQ BARC 2.74 
(0.25) 
 HSBCL 5.47* 
(0.07) 
 HSBCBS 1.50 
(0.47) 
 HSBCTQ 0.13 
(0.94) 
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 TSCOL 0.59 
(0.74) 
 TSCOBS 0.78 
(0.68) 
 TSCOTQ 1.61 
(0.45) 
 VODL 0.46 
(0.80) 
 VODBS 0.00 
(1.00) 
 VODTQ 1.93 
(0.38) 
 All 65.29*** 
(0.00) 
 All 6.87 
(0.55) 
 ALL 6.83 
(0.55) 
TSCOL BARCL 2.97 
(0.23) 
TSCOBS BARCBS 1.32 
(0.52) 
TSCOTQ BARC 0.81 
(0.67) 
 HSBCL 2.26 
(0.32) 
 HSBCBS 3.30 
(0.19) 
 HSBCTQ 2.46 
(0.29) 
 BLTL 4.15 
(0.13) 
 BLTBS 0.59 
(0.74) 
 BLTTQ 1.81 
(0.40) 
 VODL 6.54** 
(0.04) 
 VODBS 10.93*** 
(0.00) 
 VODTQ 9.03*** 
(0.01) 
 All 20.86*** 
(0.01) 
 All 20.57*** 
(0.01) 
 ALL 16.70** 
(0.03) 
VODL BARCL 3.29 
(0.19) 
VODBS BARCBS 0.97 
(0.61) 
VODTQ BARC 0.59 
(0.74) 
 HSBCL 8.10** 
(0.02) 
 HSBCBS 1.77 
(0.41) 
 HSBCTQ 0.76 
(0.68) 
 BLTL 2.27 
(0.32) 
 BLTBS 14.97*** 
(0.00) 
 BLTTQ 17.51*** 
(0.00) 
 TSCOL 9.77*** 
(0.01) 
 TSCOBS 2.08 
(0.35) 
 TSCOTQ 1.68 
(0.43) 
 All 33.52*** 
(0.00) 
 All 24.25*** 
(0.00) 
 ALL 33.77*** 
(0.00) 
Notes: We test the block causality through the Granger causality test 1) for the same share cross-listed in three different trading 
venues; and 2) five different shares within the same market. ***, ** and * indicate the significant causation spillovers at levels 
of 99%, 95% and 90%. 
37 
 
Table 5: Transformed variance coefficients.  
Panel (a): Cross-markets Transformed variance coefficients 
 Barclays HSBC BHP Billiton Tesco Vodafone 
 Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
M(1,1) 1.20E-07 7.18E-10 1.32E-07 7.11E-10 2.99E-07 7.59E-10 1.41E-07 4.54E-10 8.77E-08 3.03E-10 
M(1,2) 1.19E-07 4.58E-10 1.33E-07 5.63E-10 2.95E-07 9.20E-10 9.48E-08 2.49E-10 6.91E-08 1.97E-10 
M(1,3) 1.18E-07 5.81E-10 1.37E-07 6.07E-10 3.00E-07 8.60E-10 9.65E-08 2.72E-10 6.80E-08 2.01E-10 
M(2,2) 1.13E-07 3.82E-10 1.49E-07 6.51E-10 2.89E-07 1.24E-09 6.12E-08 2.20E-10 7.79E-08 2.44E-10 
M(2,3) 1.20E-07 4.07E-10 1.39E-07 5.94E-10 2.87E-07 9.76E-10 6.13E-08 1.03E-10 7.45E-08 2.23E-10 
M(3,3) 1.19E-07 5.98E-10 1.42E-07 7.10E-10 2.95E-07 1.06E-09 6.46E-08 1.63E-10 7.54E-08 2.48E-10 
A1(1,1)* 0.128 7.42E-04 0.245 1.44E-03 0.292 80E-4 0.291 1.16E-03 0.328 1.04E-03 
A1(1,2)* 0.126 5.87E-04 0.254 1.33E-03 0.288 9.40E-04 0.167 9.28E-04 0.358 1.35E-03 
A1(1,3)* 0.127 7.04E-04 0.248 1.27E-03 0.296 8.53E04 0.172 8.66E-04 0.350 1.34E-03 
A1(2,2)* 0.127 5.86E-04 0.272 1.42E-03 0.291 1.22E-03 0.137 9.13E-04 0.392 2.00E-03 
A1(2,3)* 0.128 6.16E-04 0.258 1.28 E-03 0.294 9.77E-03 0.136 7.70E-04 0.383 1.93E-03 
A1(3,3)* 0.130 7.93E-04 0.255 1.36 E-03 0.305 1.09E-03 0.145 7.96E-04 0.374 1.91E-03 
B1(1,1)* 0.799 9.40E-04 0.458 2.24 E-03 0.416 5.43E-03 0.441 1.37E-04 0.588 1.13E-03 
B1(1,2)* 0.798 5.54E-04 0.438 1.69 E-03 0.387 1.27E-03 0.587 9.40E-04 0.556 1.20E-03 
B1(1,3)* 0.799 8.08E-04 0.429 1.83 E-03 0.379 1.08E-03 0.580 9.16E-04 0.563 1.19E-03 
B1(2,2)* 0.817 3.20E-04 0.432 1.59 E-03 0.403 1.98E-03 0.720 9.03E-04 0.526 1.35E-03 
B1(2,3)* 0.797 5.06E-04 0.423 1.67E-03 0.3961 1.48E-03 0.714 4.85E-04 0.533 1.29E-03 
B1(3,3)* 0.799 8.40E-04 0.423 0.002031 0.391 1.58E-03 0.704 6.58E-04 0.539 1.32E-03 
Panel (b): Within-Market shares Transformed variance coefficients 
 LSE  Bats-Europe  Turquoise  
 Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
M(1,1) 9.66E-08 7.07E-10 7.63E-08 7.24E-10 5.13E-08 3.54E-10 
M(1,2) 4.99E-08 5.25E-10 3.07E-08 3.82E-10 2.74E-08 2.20E-10 
M(1,3) 4.85E-08 7.74E-10 3.17E-08 4.86E-10 2.71E-08 2.02E-10 
M(1,4) 1.27E-08 7.18E-10 8.91E-09 2.75E-10 8.52E-09 1.27E-10 
M(1,5) 1.99E-08 6.12E-10 1.78E-08 5.60E-10 1.41E-08 1.96E-10 
M(2,2) 7.88E-08 4.96E-10 4.02E-08 4.70E-10 4.70E-08 3.33E-10 
M(2,3) 4.16E-08 6.75E-10 2.30E-08 2.81E-10 2.55E-08 1.77E-10 
M(2,4) 1.02E-08 5.61E-10 6.11E-09 2.52E-10 8.95E-09 1.10E-10 
M(2,5) 1.98E-08 8.50E-10 1.71E-08 4.36E-10 1.74E-08 1.39E-10 
M(3,3) 9.97E-08 1.02E-09 5.96E-08 6.73E-10 5.29E-08 4.08E-10 
M(3,4) 1.47E-08 6.00E-10 7.61E-09 2.13E-10 9.53E-09 1.10E-10 
M(3,5) 2.18E-08 8.77E-10 2.13E-08 8.31E-10 1.72E-08 1.71E-10 
M(4,4) 3.11E-08 2.11E-10 3.14E-08 4.22E-10 2.12E-08 2.08E-10 
M(4,5) 6.99E-09 2.44E-10 8.32E-09 4.33E-10 8.18E-09 1.33E-10 
M(5,5) 8.39E-08 2.51E-10 8.28E-08 3.24E-10 7.63E-08 3.14E-10 
A1(1,1)* 0.133 0.0011 0.101 9.88E-04 0.139 8.78E-04 
A1(1,2) 0.091 0.0011 0.068 8.67E-04 0.183 8.66E-04 
A1(1,3) 0.069 0.0011 0.048 8.32E-04 0.143 7.68E-04 
A1(1,4) 0.024 0.0014 0.024 1.01E-04 0.142 7.06E-04 
A1(1,5) 0.049 0.0023 0.044 1.88E-04 0.224 1.08E-04 
A1(2,2)* 0.183 0.0011 0.124 9.06E-04 0.241 0.0012 
A1(2,3) 0.067 0.0010 0.050 7.85E-04 0.188 0.0008 
A1(2,4) 0.020 0.0015 0.018 1.09E-04 0.187 0.0009 
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A1(2,5) 0.044 0.0023 0.045 1.74E-04 0.296 0.0015 
A1(3,3)* 0.116 0.0013 0.074 9.24E-04 0.147 0.0010 
A1(3,4) 0.031 0.0014 0.022 8.80E-04 0.146 0.0007 
A1(3,5) 0.044 0.0020 0.044 0.0018 0.231 0.0012 
A1(4,4)* 0.168 0.0009 0.096 0.0009 0.145 0.0009 
A1(4,5) 0.041 0.0015 0.033 0.0014 0.230 0.0011 
A1(5,5)* 0.306 0.0012 0.329 0.0017 0.364 0.0022 
B1(1,1)* 0.822 0.0011 0.854 0.0011 0.853 0.0007 
B1(1,2)* 0.781 0.0020 0.852 0.0015 0.768 0.0009 
B1(1,3)* 0.830 0.0023 0.884 0.0015 0.833 0.0007 
B1(1,4)* 0.889 0.0059 0.917 0.0024 0.842 0.0008 
B1(1,5)* 0.792 0.0057 0.812 0.0056 0.680 0.0015 
B1(2,2)* 0.652 0.0016 0.784 0.0019 0.692 0.0013 
B1(2,3)* 0.765 0.0033 0.855 0.0016 0.750 0.0009 
B1(2,4)* 0.863 0.0072 0.912 0.0035 0.758 0.0011 
B1(2,5)* 0.736 0.0106 0.767 0.0057 0.612 0.0014 
B1(3,3)* 0.764 0.0020 0.847 0.0015 0.812 0.0010 
B1(3,4)* 0.851 0.0056 0.915 0.0022 0.821 0.0008 
B1(3,5)* 0.771 0.0088 0.769 0.0086 0.663 0.0013 
B1(4,4)* 0.774 0.0008 0.828 0.0016 0.831 0.0009 
B1(4,5)* 0.842 0.0046 0.814 0.0087 0.671 0.00144 
B1(5,5)* 0.604 0.0009 0.542 0.0015 0.542 0.0017 
Notes: We report the transformed variance coefficients from VAR-MV-GARCH with feedback models 1) for the same share 
cross-listed in three different trading venues; and 2) five different shares within the same market.  Coefficient vectors A1 indicates 
the coefficients of error terms and B1 the covariance in the multivariate settings. 
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Table 6: Granger causality tests for liquidity and liquidity and volatility. 
Panel a for cross markets  
 BARCL BARCBS BARCTQ 
BARCL        B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 
BARCBS A0, B1, C0        B1, C1, A1, B1, C0 
BARCTQ A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0       B1, C0 
 HSBCL HSBCBS HSBCTQ 
HSBCL       B1, C1 A0, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 
HSBCBS A0, B1, C0        B1, C0, A0, B1, C0 
HSBCTQ A1, B1, C0 A0, B1, C0       B1, C0 
 BLTL BLTBS BLTTQ 
BLTL B1, C1 A0, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 
BLTBS A1, B0, C0       B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
BLTTQ A1, B1, C0 A0, B1, C0       B1, C0 
 TSCOL TSCOBS TSCOTQ 
TSCOL        B1, C1 A1, B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 
TSCOBS A0, B0, C0        B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
TSCOTQ A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0       B0, C0 
 VODL VODBS VODTQ 
VODL       B1, C1 A0, B1, C0 A0, B1, C0 
VODBS A1, B0, C0        B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
VODTQ A1, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0        B0, C0 
Panel b for stocks within the market  
 BARCL HSBCL BLTL TSCOL VODL 
BARCL        B1, C1 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B0, C0 A1, B0, C0 
HSBCL A1, B1, C0       B1, C0, A1, B1, C0 A1, B0, C0, A1, B0, C0 
BLTL A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0        B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 
TSCOL A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0        B0, C0 A1, B1, C0 
VODL A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0        B1, C0 
 BARCBS HSBCBS BLTBS TSCOBS VODBS 
BARCBS        B1, C0 A0, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
HSBCBS A0, B1, C0        B1, C0 A0, B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B1, C0 
BLTBS A0, B0, C0 A1, B1, C0        B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
TSCOBS A0, B1, C0 A0, B1, C0 A0, B1, C0        B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
VODBS A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0       B0, C0 
 BARCTQ HSBCTQ BLTTQ TSCOTQ VODTQ 
BARCTQ        B1, C0 A0, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
HSBCTQ A1, B0, C0        B1, C0 A1, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
BLTTQ A0, B1, C0 A1, B1, C0        B1, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
TSCOTQ A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0        B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 
VODTQ A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0 A0, B0, C0        B0, C0 
Notes: A0 = no liqidity spillover; A1 = liquidity spillover; B0 = no liquidity to volatility spillover; B1 = liquidity to volatility 
spillover; C0 = no volatility to liquidity spillover and C1= volatility to liquidity spillover. The table only reports the outcomes of 
the granger causality tests. The statistics and p-values are available upon request. The rejection of the hypothesis is at 5% 
significant level.   
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Figures 
Figure 1: Trading Volumes 
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Figure 2: VAR-MV-GARCH for Cross-market Shares 
Panel (a) Barclays cross-market                                                   Panel (b) HSBC cross-market 
  
Panel (c) BHP Billiton cross-market                                          Panel (d) TESCO cross-market  
 
Panel (e) Vodafone cross-market  
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Figure 3: VAR-MV-GARCH for Within-market Shares 
Panel (a) LSE 
 
Panel (b) BATS-Europe 
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Panel (c) Turquoise 
 
